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ABSTRACT
Carl Cohen’s arguments against animal rights are shown to be unsound. His strategy entails
that animals have rights, that humans do not, the negations of those conclusions, and other
false and inconsistent implications. His main premise seems to imply that one can fail all tests
and assignments in a class and yet easily pass if one’s peers are passing and that one can
become a convicted criminal merely by setting foot in a prison. However, since his moral
principles imply that nearly all exploitive uses of animals are wrong anyway, foes of animal
rights are advised to seek philosophical consolations elsewhere. I note that some other
philosophers’ arguments are subject to similar objections.

1. Introduction
Carl Cohen is one of the most prominent philosophical advocates of the view that nonhuman sentient
animals (hereafter, ‘animals’), do not, and cannot, have moral rights. Many who enjoy and profit from the
infliction of pain, suffering and death on animals, especially those in the vivisection industry, strongly
applaud his efforts at attempting to defend the moral propriety of their outlook and deeds [1].
Any plausible argument against animal rights must provide an explanation why humans with mental lives
less sophisticated than animals’ mental lives have rights. Very few are willing to argue that it would be
(and, in historical cases, has been) morally permissible to subject these humans to experiments that
animals are subject to (e.g., drowning, suffocating, starving, burning; blinding them and destroying their
ability to hear; damaging their brains, severing their limbs, crushing their organs; inducing heart attacks,
ulcers, paralysis, seizures; forcing them to inhale tobacco smoke, drink alcohol, and ingest various drugs,
such as heroine and cocaine, etc.) [2].
Cohen agrees that these humans (regrettably, often called ‘marginal’ humans) have rights. I will argue
that his explanation why these humans have rights entails, surprisingly (and contrary to his intentions),
that animals have rights as well. His strategy also has the surprising consequence that no humans have
rights. Furthermore, his strategy supports the negations of these conclusions, so it has inconsistent and
other false implications. Rescuing these arguments depends on, among other things, solving a seemingly
intractable problem in probability theory and metaphysics, so it is highly doubtful that they can be
salvaged. A number of other philosophers’ arguments are similar to Cohen’s and are subject to similar
objections.

These conclusions will probably be upsetting for those who see Cohen as their moral advocate. What
might be more upsetting for them, however, is that Cohen’s stated moral principles imply that nearly all
uses of animals are wrong anyway. Thus, his position provides, in a certain sense, a moral defence of
animals: his views are fundamentally contrary to the views of those who appeal to him to try to defend
their harmful uses of animals [3].
2. Moral Rights
Some philosophers reject talk of ‘rights,’ but here I will presume that the true morality includes moral
rights. What does Cohen mean by ‘rights’? This must be understood in order to evaluate his arguments
that humans have rights but animals have none. Cohen briefly explains his concept:
A right, properly understood, is a claim, or potential claim, that one party may exercise
against another. The target against whom such a claim may be registered can be a single
person, a group, a community, or (perhaps) all humankind [4].
Here, the question is whether animals have a claim to their most fundamental interests—in not being
subject to pain and suffering, in retaining bodily and mental integrity, and in life itself [5], — being
respected, even if failing to respect those interests would benefit humans. As Cohen puts it, the question
is whether animals have “the right not to be used like inanimate tools to advance human interests . . . no
matter how important we think those human interests to be” [6].
Cohen’s conception of rights is consistent with Tom Regan’s brief explanation of what it is to have rights:
To have a right is to be in a position to claim, or to have claimed on one’s behalf, that
something is due or owed, and that the claim that is made is a claim against somebody,
to do or forbear what is claimed as due [7].
Here what is ‘due’ or ‘owed’ is respectful treatment. Cohen and Regan agree that if animals are due this
respect, then all industries and practices that exploit animals for their instrumental value ought to be
abolished, and the individuals involved in this exploitation should be stopped. And this is true, regardless
of the possible losses to the exploiters: they have no right to ill-gotten gains. Thus, the picture of rights is
that of invisible ‘No Trespassing’ signs and moral ‘trump’ cards, an exceedingly non-utilitarian and nonaggregative moral outlook. Rights impose the duty that justice is done, as the saying goes, ‘though the
heavens fall.’
These characterizations are rough and raise many difficult theoretical questions about the nature of rights
[8] but are sufficient for our purposes.
3. An Understandable Misinterpretation of Cohen’s Argument
Let us agree that humans have moral rights in the sense that Cohen specifies. If humans have rights and
animals have none, this must be explained by some difference between humans and animals. Cohen
must hold that there is some necessary condition for having rights that humans meet but that all animals
fail to satisfy.
To identify this condition, Cohen seems to makes an important set of observations about humans [9]. He
notes that only humans are able to conceive of their actions using moral concepts; only we are able to
believe that we can do right and wrong and choose to act in accordance with (or in violation of ) the moral
law: only we can freely restrict our own behaviour out of respect for others. These remarks strongly
suggest that, on Cohen’s view, whether an individual has rights depends on whether that individual has

these properties, which he calls the ‘capacity for free moral judgment’ [10]. This seems especially clear
since he claims that, ‘holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty, governing all
including themselves . . . [H]olders of rights must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own
interest and what is just’ [11].
Although there is some controversy on these empirical matters, let us agree with Cohen that only humans
possess the capacity for moral judgment. This forms the basis of a common interpretation of Cohen’s
argument that animals have no rights. It proceeds as follows:
(i) If an individual lacks the capacity for free moral judgment, then he or she does not have moral rights.
(ii) All animals lack the capacity for free moral judgment.
(iii) Therefore, animals do not have moral rights.
Given Cohen’s words, this is a plausible interpretation. However, a critic will quickly point out that premise
(i) has a false implication that shows it to be false. Cohen fairly states the critics’ objection:
If having rights requires being able to make moral claims, to grasp and apply moral laws,
then many humans — the brain-damaged, the comatose, the senile — who plainly lack
those capacities must be without rights. But that is absurd. This proves (the critic
concludes) that rights do not depend on the presence of moral capacities [12].
Cohen agrees that it is ‘absurd,’ or, at least, mistaken, to think that the brain-damaged, the (presumably,
non-permanently) comatose, and the senile do not have rights. He agrees that this objection refutes
premise (i) above and shows this argument to be unsound.
4. The ‘Kind’ Interpretation of Cohen’s Arguments
But Cohen can reply that the above argument is not his argument. He explicitly announced that the ‘core’
of his argument against animals’ having rights is this:
Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of that word) lack this capacity for free
moral judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable of exercising or responding to moral
claims. Animals therefore have no rights, and they can have none [13].
The critics’ objection addresses only the first sentence in this quotation, which, if taken to suggest a
necessary condition for having rights, is mistaken (and Cohen agrees). But the critics’ objection overlooks
the second sentence. Cohen’s argument, therefore, is this:
(1) If an individual is of a kind that lacks the capacity for free moral judgment, then he or she does not
have moral rights.
(2) Each animal is of a kind that lacks the capacity for free moral judgment.
(3) Therefore, animals do not have moral rights.
Call this ‘the “kind” argument against animal rights.’ Cohen’s remark suggests a separate argument for
the bolder conclusion that animals not only do not have rights, but that they cannot have rights, but that
argument is worth serious attention only if Cohen shows that, as things actually are, animals do not have
rights.
These arguments are improvements over the Understandable Misinterpretation in that, at least, they do
not obviously appear to be subject to objections from cases of ‘marginal’ humans. But Cohen’s case
against animals can succeed only if he is able to show why these humans have rights, despite their

lacking the capacity for moral judgment and (apparently) failing to meet his stated necessary condition for
rights. Cohen thus has another ‘kind’ argument to attempt to circumvent that objection:
(1*) If an individual is of a kind that possesses the capacity for free moral judgment, then he or she has
moral rights.
(2*) Each ‘marginal’ human is of a kind that possesses the capacity for free moral judgment.
(3*) Therefore, ‘marginal’ humans have moral rights.
Cohen’s ‘kind’ arguments are not easy to evaluate since Cohen does not explain his premises. In
particular, he does not explain what he means by his use of the term ‘kind.’ What ‘kinds’ are and what it is
to be ‘of a kind’ is not obvious or clear. Since his arguments depend on ‘marginal’ humans being of a kind
that animals are not of (and could not be of ) and moral principles that appeal to ‘kinds’, it is doubly
unfortunate that he does not explain what he means.
Thus, some interpretation is necessary. I will first attempt to understand why the second premises of the
‘kind’ arguments, (2) and (2*), might be true: why are we supposed to think that animals are not of a kind
that has the capacity for free moral judgment but that marginal humans are, even though they are unable
to make moral judgments? After some discussion of the problematic nature of these premises (including
an argument that [2*] is necessarily false), I settle on an interpretation that allows for them to be true. But
I then argue that, given Cohen’s moral principles (1) and (1*), this interpretation has implications that are
surprising: first, that animals have rights, and, second, the false and inconsistent implications that humans
do and do not have rights and that even everything does and does not have rights. These consequences
show that Cohen’s strategy is seriously and irredeemably flawed.
For the sake of this first set of arguments I accept Cohen’s moral principles (1) and (1*) as true. I later
argue, however, that they are false because they are instances of an obviously false general principle.
5. An Unkind Objection: ‘Kinds’ Lack Moral Properties
Let me first present a perhaps unkind objection. Cohen claims that animals are not of a kind capable of
exercising or responding to moral claims and that ‘marginal’ humans are. To me, these are odd claims
because, strictly speaking, kinds are never capable of exercising or responding to moral claims anyway.
‘Kinds’ are abstract objects, classificatory devices, or metaphysical entities. Individuals are members of
kinds in virtue of what properties they have. Perhaps all individuals of a particular kind can respond to
moral claims, but the kind itself does not. To see this, consider this case:
Benjamin, Jennifer and Joshua encounter a mother in financial distress who desperately
needs money to buy medicine for her sick child: she makes a ‘moral claim’ for their
financial assistance. They go with her to buy the medicine and split the cost three ways.
Here the three individuals responded to the moral claim: although though they are of that kind ‘beings
able to respond to moral claims,’ the kind itself provided no financial assistance. Since there are no kinds
capable of responding to moral claims, nothing can be of such a kind. So premise (2) is true: each animal
is of a kind that lacks the capacity for moral judgment. But it’s true since all kinds lack this capacity. But
since all kinds lack this capacity, Cohen’s premise (2*) — that ‘marginal’ humans are of a kind that
possesses the capacity for free moral judgment — is false. Furthermore, that premise would seem to be
necessarily false since there probably is no possible world where kinds, as abstract objects, have moral
capacities. Thus, Cohen’s argument’s dependence on kinds in this way results in it being either unsound
or necessarily unsound: it fails to show that ‘marginal’ humans have rights.

But perhaps I’ve been too uncharitable (or dense) in failing to understand what a kind is. Let us then
overlook this possible refutation. Cohen needs to retain some interpretation of what it is to be of a kind
that might allow him to respond to the objection from cases of ‘marginal’ humans. I will develop a number
of responses and show that they all fail for Cohen’s purposes.
6. What Kind Are You? What Kind Are Animals?
To see why premise (2) might be true, i.e., why animals are not of a kind that possesses the capacity for
free moral judgment, it might be helpful to see why (2*), the analogous premise, is supposedly true for
‘marginal’ humans.
Let us then consider a case: suppose scientists were, in secret, to perform painful and lethal experiments
on some orphaned and permanently severely mentally challenged human infants, experiments which they
know will greatly improve the lives of many other humans. Cohen is no utilitarian and he denies that
anyone has a ‘right’ to his or her life’s being improved at the serious expense of others. So, as far as I can
tell, he would judge this experiment as seriously wrong because it would greatly violate these infants’
rights.
Let us agree, but ask why. Again, Cohen says this is so because these humans are of a kind that
possesses the capacity for free moral judgment. That’s just premise (2*). He explains:
Persons who are unable, because of some disability [or age], to perform the full moral
functions natural to human beings are certainly not for that reason ejected from the moral
community. The issue is one of kind. Humans are of such a kind that they may be the
subjects of experiments only with their voluntary consent . . . Animals are of such a kind
that it is impossible for them, in principle, to give or withhold voluntary consent or make a
moral choice. What humans retain when disabled, animals never had [14].
Although interesting, these remarks still do not explain why ‘marginal’ humans are of such a rightsconferring kind and animals are not. We are not told what it is about them that determines their kindmemberships. We must, therefore, speculate on what these reasons might be.
6.1. Kinds Depend on What’s ‘Normal’?
First, it might be said that (2*) is true because since ‘normal’ human beings (i.e., adults) are of the kind
‘possesses moral capacities,’ ‘marginal’ humans are also of that kind. Roger Scruton might endorse this
suggestion when he writes, “Infants and imbeciles belong to the same kind as you or me: the kind whose
normal instances are also moral beings” [15].
Here ‘normal’ seems to be understood in a statistical sense: if most human beings have some
characteristic, then it’s normal. But this defence of (2*) succeeds only if this general principle is true: if
‘normal’ human beings are of some kind K, then ‘marginal’ humans are of that kind K as well. But this
principle seems clearly false: ‘normal’ human beings are of the kinds ‘able to make pasta’, ‘able to
reproduce’, and ‘able to solve maths problems and drive cars’ but ‘marginal’ humans can do none of
these: they are not of the kind ‘pasta-maker’ or ‘equation solver.’ Most ‘normal’ human beings are also of
the kind ‘over four feet fall’, but most ‘marginal’ humans (i.e., infants) are quite short: they are not of that
kind.
Thus, in general, that fact that it is normal for some humans to be of some kind (or have some property)
does not entail that non-normal humans are also of that kind (or have that property). So these

considerations provide no straightforward reason to think that humans who are statistically abnormal have
the capacity for moral judgment or are of that kind [16].
6.2. Kinds Depend on What’s ‘Natural’?
Similar responses would also be directed to the charge that since it’s ‘natural’ for humans to have some
specific capacities or abilities, ‘marginal’ humans have them as well and so are of the corresponding kind.
(Below we will see that Cohen uses the term ‘natural’, perhaps to suggest just this).
While the meaning of ‘natural’ is often obscure, this principle is refuted by the fact that although it’s
‘natural’ for humans to have two arms and IQ scores greater than 90, obviously, there are humans
without two arms or with quite low IQ scores. These humans are, of course, of the kind ‘human,’ but they
are obviously not of the kinds ‘having two arms’ or ‘having average IQ.’ So the fact that some
characteristic is ‘natural’ does not entail that all humans (including ‘marginal’ humans) have it. So appeals
to what’s ‘natural’ again provide no reason to think that marginal humans are of the kind ‘possess moral
capacities.’
6.3. Kinds Depend on ‘Potentials’ and Logical Possibilities?
A third suggestion for thinking that ‘marginal’ humans are of a kind that possesses the capacity for moral
judgment is to (apparently) disagree with Cohen and argue that ‘marginal’ humans do, in fact, possess
the capacity for moral judgment and, therefore, they are of that ‘kind.’ It might be said that they have this
capacity because they are potential moral agents, or could be moral agents, and so are of that kind. This
response has some initial plausibility, perhaps, since there are unrealized capacities, i.e., abilities that are
never exercised: maybe even though ‘marginal’ humans do not make moral judgments, in some sense
they could, so they are of that kind.
This response is problematic in many ways: first, given moral principle (1*), it implies that human fetuses
are also of that kind, so all abortions violate their rights, as does any ‘terminal’ experimentation on human
cells or tissues that could become moral agents. This would include not just fertilized eggs and (frozen or
fresh) embryos, but any other (human or non-human) cells that could be cultivated into moral agents were
certain technologies (eventually) applied to them. It also might imply that contraception and even
abstinence violate rights if, like a table-and-set-of-chairs can be considered one thing, an egg-and-asperm-that-could-fertilize-it is one thing as well, since that sum of those parts has the potential to become
a moral agent (as it often does). If this case against animal rights entails that all abortions, contraception,
and all other activities that prevent potential moral agents from existing violate rights, then at least some
of these consequences might rightly be seen as a reductio of this response.
Second, this response doesn’t seem to cover all actual ‘marginal’ humans since, for some who are very
seriously damaged or incapacitated, a medical professional might truly judge (and Cohen would agree)
that they even lack the potential to become moral agents since, given their biological condition, that is
medically impossible for them: in their lives they will never make moral judgments. One might respond,
however, that there is a broader sense of ‘potential’ that applies to these humans. Alan White suggests
this response; he says that ‘marginal’ humans “may be for various reasons empirically unable to fulfil the
full role of a rights-holder. But . . . they are logically possible subjects of rights to whom the full language
of rights can significantly, however falsely, be used” [17]. While advocates of ‘marginal’ humans do not
want to agree that these rights ascriptions are false, if the suggestion is that since it’s logically possible for
these humans to be moral agents, they are of that kind and thereby have rights, then since it’s also
logically possible for animals to be moral agents (i.e., that’s not formally contradictory), then animals are

of that kind and have rights as well. So I presume that the foe of animal rights does not endorse this
defence of (2*).
Finally, it’s not at all clear what motivates this response anyway. Although it doesn’t seem to presume the
false principle ‘if something potentially or could have property P, then it has property P now’, it’s not clear
how it works. Some moral agents are mass murderers: does that mean that all ‘marginal’ humans are
potential mass murderers and so are of the kind ‘mass murderer’? Some are firefighters: are all humans
thereby of the kind ‘firefighter’? Or does this response apply only to ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ characteristic and
so only these are ones that ‘marginal’ humans have as ‘potentials’? If so, then this response seems
subject to the objection above. Either way, given this response’s problematic implications and its obscure
motivations, it is clear that this appeal to potential is not the way to make a strong case that ‘marginal’
humans have rights and animals do not.
6.4. Kinds and the Grouping Response
Finally, it might be said that (2*) is true — ‘marginal’ humans are of a kind that possesses the capacity for
moral judgment — simply because they are human. Many people, especially non-philosophers, would
think that this is the obvious reason why they have rights. Cohen, in fact, says this: ‘Human children, like
elderly adults have rights because they are human’ [18]. I aim to show that the most plausible defence of
this claim has disastrous implications for Cohen’s perspective.
Recall that the claim isn’t that being human is sufficient for having moral capacities (since Cohen agrees
that there are humans who lack these capacities); rather it is that being human is sufficient for being of a
kind that possesses the capacity for moral judgment. But ‘being human’ is multiply ambiguous: on the one
hand, it might mean ‘biologically human,’ ‘being of the species homo sapiens,’ or ‘having human DNA.’
But on that meaning, human cells and tissues are of that kind and so have rights. Cohen doesn’t appear
to think this, so I presume that when he says that ‘marginals’ are human, he means something like that
they are human organisms who are living, intact, and have achieved sufficient development to be
sometimes conscious. This description is imperfect, but the question still remains: how is it that all beings
like that are of a kind that possesses the capacity for moral judgment?
Cohen never asks or answers a question like this, but I suspect his complete answer would be something
like this:
To have rights, something (or someone) must be of a kind that possesses moral
capacities: being of a kind that possesses moral agency is necessary for having rights.
‘Marginal’ humans are of a kind that possesses moral capacities because they are
human. Being human makes them a member of the kind that possesses moral
capacities. This is because all moral agents are of that kind: all moral agents are human.
Since moral agents and ‘marginal’ humans are both of the kind ‘human’ [19] — they
share a property — ‘marginals’ are also of a kind that possesses moral capacities as well.
Therefore, they have moral rights.
If this is Cohen’s strategy (and it seems that this, or something very much like it, is), then the animal rights
advocate can play that game to ‘demonstrate’ that, pace Cohen, animals are also of the kind that has
moral capacities and, therefore, have rights.
Why are animals of such a rights-generating kind? For Cohen-esque reasons exactly parallel to those
given in defence of ‘marginal’ humans. The reasoning will run like this: first, most humans are moral
agents and so, on Cohen’s view, have rights; second, there is a kind that both moral agents and animals
are members of, e.g. the kind ‘sentient being,’ ‘conscious being,’ ‘subject of a life’, or ‘being with

preferences’ (in fact, there are many kinds that animals and humans share membership in); and third;
since animals and moral agents are both of a kind, e.g. the kind ‘sentient being’ — i.e. they share a
property — animals are also of a kind that possesses moral capacities and, therefore, they have rights.
This method of reasoning can also be used to ‘demonstrate’ falsely that, from Cohen’s perspective,
humans have no rights. Consider all the various objects on earth: most of them are of the kind ‘lacking
moral capacities’ and so, on Cohen’s view, they don’t have rights. But humans are of a kind with these
various objects, e.g. the kind ‘thing on earth’ or ‘earthly specimen’ or an ‘object quite far from the sun.’
Since most members of these kinds lack the capacity for free moral judgments and humans are members
of these kinds, this fact and Cohen’s premise (1) — if an individual is of a kind that lacks the capacity for
free moral judgment then it does not have moral rights — imply that humans do not have rights. But,
perhaps I’ve got it backwards: since all these non-conscious material objects are of a kind with normal
humans since they share properties with these humans, they all have rights too. Since all these
inconsistent conclusions (and more) are warranted on Cohen-esque reasoning, these are devastating
implications.
Cohen might object and claim that not just any old shared property will do the trick to get an individual into
a kind that possesses moral capacities. He might claim that the only relevant shared property, or common
kind, is biological: only that can provide the proper, rights-conferring relation to moral agents [20]. But he
provides no reason why this is so. He can pick biological or genetic kinds to try to suit his purposes, but
the defender of animal rights can grant Cohen’s strategy and just pick other relations and shared
properties to justify her contrary conclusions. Different kinds of properties are equally shared between
animals, ‘marginal’ humans and moral agents. And, as we’ve seen, Cohen’s strategy can be adopted to
support any conclusion and its negation. Cohen provides no reason to side with any perspective on this
issue: they are all equally plausible on his account and, thus his account is highly implausible.
Making the issue ‘one of kind’ is highly problematic since humans and animals are all members of
infinitely many kinds or classes: we are all ‘tokens’ of many ‘types.’ It is very difficult (if not impossible) to
identify what kind one is in a non-arbitrary manner since no one group or kind can reasonably be said to
be ‘the’ group or kind that someone is a member of. Most who work in probability theory and metaphysics
concede that this problem, sometimes called the ‘reference problem,’ is a highly intractable. Cohen does
not explain how one picks what kind of thing something is or which kind, of the many kinds any one thing
is, best suits that thing. On the one hand, he claims that being of the kind ‘possesses moral capacities’ is
necessary for having rights, but on the other hand he claims that being of the kind ‘human’ is sufficient for
being of a kind that possesses moral capacities. Any attempt to get from the former to the latter kind is
going to require an arbitrary and indefensible pick of the kind.
In sum, to return to the ‘kind’ arguments, if we grant that (2) and (2*) are true, on what I have suggested is
the best explanation for why they are true, animals are also of a kind that possess the capacity for moral
judgments and humans are of kinds that lack it. This is because animals are members of groups where
some (or most) of the members have moral capacities and humans (‘marginal’ or not) are members of
groups where none (or few) of the members have moral capacities. Given Cohen’s moral principles (1)
and (1*), this implies that animals and humans both have and don’t have rights, as well as other obviously
false and inconsistent conclusions. Cohen’s arguments are clearly deeply flawed. Perhaps there is
another way to interpret them, but nothing suggests itself in Cohen’s writings.
8. Partners in ‘Kind’
Cohen’s ‘getting-rights-by-association-in-a-kind’ strategy is not unique. As mentioned above, Scruton
seems to invoke it. Michael Allen Fox suggested it: he claimed that that “human beings have basic moral

rights because they are beings of the requisite kind, that is, autonomous beings, persons, or moral
agents.” In response to the objection that some humans aren’t autonomous moral agents, he claimed that
“membership in our own species ought to count for something” [21]. But explaining how human biology
might, in itself, ‘count’ for being of the kind ‘moral agent’ is obviously difficult. And it’s not clear why our
memberships in the kinds ‘sentient-being’ or ‘subject-of-alife’ aren’t more obviously rights-relevant
anyway. Fox agrees; he later rejected his original position against animals calling it arrogant, complacent
and arbitrary.
David Schmidtz suggests that a speciesist could respond to objections from ‘marginal’ cases in this way:
Of course, some chimpanzees lack the characteristic features in virtue of which
chimpanzees command respect as a species, just as some humans lack the
characteristic features in virtue of which humans command respect as a species. It is
equally obvious that some chimpanzees have cognitive capacities (for example) that are
superior to the cognitive capacities of some humans. But whether every human being is
superior to every chimpanzee is beside the point. The point is that we can, we do, and we
should make decisions on the basis of our recognition that mice, chimpanzees, and
humans are relevantly different types. We can have it both ways after all [22].
While mice, chimpanzees, and humans are of different types, they are also of some same types since
they share many properties. The problem for this speciesist would be specifying, in a plausible and
defensible manner, why being of the type ‘biologically human’ is, in itself, a morally relevant type. It
appears not to be, since human biology seems neither necessary nor sufficient for having rights: friendly
space aliens could have rights and dead, human cells in a Petri dish do not. This speciesist would also
need to explain why a psychological type such as sentience or being-the-subject-of-a-life is not relevant
(or is not as relevant). She cannot have it both ways: either she has a theory of rights that appeals to
plausible, psychological types as the basis for rights (which overlap between species), or she appeals to
types that are not in themselves morally relevant, like DNA possession.
Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman might provide some help: they suggest that “what are
important are the relations in which human beings stand to one another” [23]. They base these relations
on shared biological properties, but no reason is given why shared psychological properties are not the
basis of an equally, or at least very, important relation. Finally, Robert Wennberg suggests that, “a
fundamental difference in kind [between humans and animals] can be found in the religious capacity
possessed by humans” [24]. True, some humans have these capacities, but not all. And if ‘marginal’
humans’ rights depends on these capacities, any attempts to secure them by a relation are probably
subject to Cohen-esque objections all over again.
So, Cohen is not alone in his kind arguments, but other philosophers’ attempts are as unsuccessful as his
are. ‘Kind’ strategies are often suggested, but never carefully developed or defended.
9. Cohen’s False Moral Principles
Until now, my focus has been on premises (2) and (2*). I will now argue that Cohen’s moral principles (1)
and (1*) are instances of a false principle, although one we might sometimes (and sometimes not) wish
were true. I will call it the ‘Getting a Property by Association Principle.’ Much of my discussion has already
alluded to it: it is a more general formulation of the motivating idea behind Cohen’s moral principles:
If (1) an individual A is a member of some kind K and (2) some, most or all of the other
members of that kind K have some property C and (3), on the basis of having property C,

they have property R, then individual A has property R as well, even though A lacks
property C.
Something like this principle seems to be the driving force behind Cohen’s response to the argument from
marginal cases: even though each marginal human (A) lacks moral capacities (C), since each is a
member of a group or kind (K) where the other members possesses moral capacities (C) and so have
rights (R) because of their moral capacities (C), marginal humans have rights (R), roughly, by association.
Consider a case where you’d wish this principle were true: you are a student (A) in a class who has failed
the exams and done none of the homework so, on your own merits, you are failing. However, fortunately
for you, the rest of the students have the properties of ‘passing the exams and done well on the
homework’ (C) and, on that basis, have the property (R), passing the course.’ If Cohen’s principle were
true, you too would have the property of passing the class as well because you are a member of the kind
(K) ‘students taking this class’ and the properties from the majority transfer to you. Unfortunately for you,
this property you would possess only on your own merits (which you lack since you have failed the exams
and have done none of the work), so Cohen’s principle is false.
A case were you’d be glad that this principle were false would be one where you (A) visit a friend who has
been convicted of a heinous crime (C) and, on that basis, is now serving a life sentence in prison (R).
Let’s suppose that most people in this prison have these two properties. However, upon entering the
prison as a visitor you become a member of the kind (K) ‘a person who is physically located in the prison’
and you are part of this kind or group along with the prisoners. However, fortunately for you, even though
you are now of that kind, their properties of (C) ‘being convicted of a heinous crime’ and (R) ‘now serving
a life sentence’ do not transfer to you. Now you are glad that Cohen’s principle is false and that you can’t
get these properties by association.
Since Cohen’s moral premises (1) and (1*) reply on the false ‘Getting a Property by Association Principle,’
this is yet another reason to reject Cohen’s arguments.
10. Cohen’s Other Arguments
Cohen offers suggestions for other arguments against animal rights. Most are not ideally clear and are
underdeveloped, but they deserve comment. He claims that,
Rights arise, and can be intelligibly defended, only among beings who actually do, or can, make moral
claims against one another. Whatever else rights may be, therefore, they are necessarily human; their
possessors are persons, human beings [25].
To reply roughly in reverse order of the quote; first, from the fact that human persons possess rights it
does not follow that animals do not; second, since rights themselves clearly are not human, they are not
‘necessarily human.’ Perhaps Cohen means to point out the obvious truth that the concept of rights is a
concept that, as far as we know, only humans have. Maybe he wanted to make the bold suggestion that,
necessarily, only humans have that concept. But even if those claims were true, that does not show that
animals don’t have rights: animals not having the concept of p does not entail that they lack the property
of p. Animals lack the concept of ‘being an animal’, but they still are animals: like us they have many
properties for which they lack related concepts.
To continue, third; the only beings who will ‘intelligibly defend’ rights will be beings who are intellectually
sophisticated enough to grasp the concept of rights: they will likely have rights themselves, but this
implies nothing for beings who cannot defend their rights; fourth, animal advocates agree with Cohen that
animals have rights only against moral agents: were there no moral agents then no one, including

animals, would have rights; and, fifth, again while the concept of rights was developed by, or ‘arose’
among, intelligent moral agents, this does not show that animals don’t have the property of having rights:
the concept of ‘DNA’ arose among moral agents, but animals have a genetic code. Thus, nothing here
gives any plausible reason to think animals do not or cannot have rights.
Cohen also claims that,
Animals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of rights is essentially
human; it is rooted in, and has force within, a human moral world [26].
There is much unclear about these claims. What it is for a concept to be ‘essentially human’ is not said.
But if the concept of rights is ‘essentially human’ and so animals therefore cannot have the property of
having rights, then since the concept of humane treatment seems to be as ‘essentially human’ as the
concept of rights is, it would seem that Cohen should think animals cannot have the property of being
such that we’re obligated to treat them humanely either [27]. Since Cohen does think that animals should
be treated humanely [28], he can’t think that animals need to have that concept in order for us to be
obligated to treat them that way. So, on Cohen’s own view, the fact that animals lack the concept of rights
is irrelevant to whether they might have rights. If the suggestion is that something can have a property
only if it (or things of its kind, to muddy the waters) possesses the correlated concept, this is clearly false
since we all have properties for which we lack the related concepts [29]. Again, the fact that the concept
of rights applies to humans and is ‘rooted in’ and has ‘force within’ human communities again does not
imply that animals do not or cannot have rights.
Cohen also suggests that having rights is an ‘essential’ property of humans: this would correspond to his
‘kind’ conclusion that it’s impossible for animals to have rights [30]. On a common view, if an individual
has a property ‘essentially’ then is it metaphysically impossible for that individual to exist without that
property. Since Cohen’s suggestion raises too many deep metaphysical questions, which he has not yet
addressed, I will not speculate on what the arguments that might be developed from this suggestion
would look like. However, even if it were true that humans (or all
rights-bearers in the actual world) essentially, or necessarily, have rights (which seems to be false, given
the logical possibility of a Planet of the Apes-like scenario where humans have the mental sophistication
of apes and so, on Cohen’s view, do not and cannot have rights), that wouldn’t imply that animals can’t
have rights either.
11. Is Cohen’s Position an Animal Rights Position?
While others have shown that Cohen’s arguments are defective, I hope that I have shown that they are
even worse than anyone suspected since, for one thing, any argument against animal rights that can be
converted to an argument for animal rights and against human rights (and other false and inconsistent
conclusions) is a great blunder. While critics often claim that animal advocates care more about animals
than humans, and are sometimes even called ‘human haters’, if Cohen-esque arguments imply that
humans don’t have rights, these critics have missed their true target.
To defend his arguments, Cohen will have to solve the ‘kind’ problem I have identified above: for deep
reasons beyond moral philosophy, this is likely to be very difficult, if not impossible. To respond to the
objection from ‘marginal’ humans, he will have to adequately explain what properties humans possess
that makes them have rights. It isn’t the relation that he suggests, since, if it is, there are other relations
that defeat his position and his strategy results in stalemate. He will have to explain why the presumption,
which he rejects, that ‘rights are tied to some identifiable individual abilities or sensibilities’ [31] is
mistaken even though the denial of this claim led first a vicious regress (since if an individual’s rights

aren’t tied to her abilities and sensibilities, but are tied to another individual’s, but hers are tied to
someone else’s, whose are tied to someone else’s, ad infinitum, then there is no basis for rights); and led,
secondly, to epistemological skepticism about rights (if they’re not tied to identifiable abilities, are they tied
to unidentifiable abilities? If so, we can’t identify them).
Of course, to refute Cohen’s arguments is not to show that the conclusions he advocates — that animals
do not and cannot have rights — are not true: it is only to show that Cohen has provided no rational
support for them whatsoever. Anyone who accepts Cohen’s conclusions can concede his defeat: to
rationally retain his or her view, however, she need only then base her belief that animals do not have
rights on stronger reasons than those Cohen offers. If she has these reasons, then she should not be
troubled; if not, she needs to develop them or find someone who can, if she wishes to rationally maintain
her view. Thus, the animal exploitation industries and community need to find a new philosophical
defender of the moral propriety of their practices. The likelihood that their search will be successful is very
low [32].
Were Cohen’s arguments salvageable, however, that would not really help animal exploiters defend
themselves. After all, Cohen also claims that “We have a universal obligation to act humanely, and this
means that we must refrain from imposing pain on sentient creatures so far as we reasonably can,” and
he states that animals “ought not be made to suffer needlessly” (whether he would allow for animals to
have a right not to be made to suffer needlessly is unclear) [33]. But all, or nearly all, uses of animals for
food, fashion, education, entertainment and product ‘testing’ cause pain and suffering that we can
reasonably refrain from imposing since we don’t need any of the products from this exploitation in order to
have meaningful and healthy lives. So these uses of animals are morally condemnable on Cohen’s view
[34]. Cohen also expresses ‘repugnance for the hunting of animals for mere amusement’ [35], but,
ultimately, nearly all other uses of animals come to mere amusement as well since they’re only for the
merely aesthetic pleasures of experiencing certain tastes, wearing certain clothing, being entertained in
certain ways and using certain cosmetics and personal and household products (all of which can be
experienced in cruelty-free manners or easily gone without). Thus, given what follows from the empirical
facts and Cohen’s own moral principles, his views are, in a certain sense and concerning the issues that
affect most animals, those of an animal rights advocate after all.
As for vivisection, neither Cohen nor anyone else has shown that it is ‘necessary’ for medical progress:
nobody has shown that some specified amount of vivisection is (probably) indispensable for bringing
about the greatest possible overall medical benefits. Nobody has argued that, despite all the other
research methods available (and, more generally, methods of improving people’s health, most of which
are just the implementation and distribution of existing medical knowledge anyway, not new research), no
other possible use of funds, time and talent could (or likely would) bring about a greater improvement in
health for humans than animal research [36].
Few advocates of vivisection accept utilitarianism, but they often they appeal to it to try to justify their
actions [37]. But, again, no one has done anything close to the conceptual and empirical work that would
be needed to make a serious attempt as justify any animal research on utilitarian grounds: no advocate of
vivisection has provided any method for calculating and comparing (actual) animal harms to (merely
possible) human benefits, calculated direct human harms that are consequence of vivisection, calculated
indirect harms and opportunity costs that result from funds being directed towards vivisection and not
towards producing other benefits (and utilitarianism has no bias for medical benefits), and somehow
added it all up to conclude reasonably that the calculation favours using animals. Even if some benefits
were lost were some or all vivisection stopped, that would not be enough to justify it on utilitarian grounds,
since one has to show that there is no alternative course of action that would yield greater benefits.

Perhaps this case can be made, but nobody has tried. Until this is done, the most reasonable attitude
might be a skeptical one.
12. What Kind We Are
In conclusion, it is sometimes said that we should first look after or take care of ‘our own kind.’ It used to
be thought that ‘our kind’ was our race, or sex, or ethnic group, or social class. Outsiders were judged ‘not
of our kind’ and that justified inconsiderate, often exploitive, treatment. Fortunately, those responses are
now seen as the unjustified prejudices they were. But we are of many kinds and the pressing challenge is
to identify the morally relevant ones. Since it seems that ‘marginal’ humans have rights, moral agency is
not necessary for rights: to think we are responsible only to other moral agents — that they are our
unique kind and due preferential treatment — would be another unjustifiable prejudice. But since being of
the kind ‘biologically human’ is neither logically sufficient nor conceptually necessary for having rights,
biological kinds are not in themselves morally relevant either. Furthermore, we share little, morally, with
human cells in flasks or organs in an icepack: bare biology doesn’t count for much. Insofar as Cohen’s
case appeals to both those kinds, it is flawed.
So, if Cohen is mistaken, what kind is morally relevant? If it were true that we should take care of our own
kind, what kind would that be? The simplest answer, with the most explanatory power, is that the
boundary of our kind is not marked by species or moral agency. What kind are we? We are conscious,
sentient beings, and many human and non-human animals are like us in that. Being of that kind is what’s
fundamentally morally relevant, vast practical consequences follow from this, and Cohen provides no
reason to think otherwise [38].
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NOTES
[1] David DeGrazia reports that Cohen’s arguments against animal rights and in favour of speciesism, not
giving animals’ interests even serious (not necessarily equal) consideration and the human utility of
vivisection have been ‘much praised by the medical community but severely criticized by philosophers.’ D.
DeGrazia (1996) Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press), p. 36, footnote 2. He references some articles that contain such praise and comments
that “It is a sad statement about prevailing levels of intellectual integrity that uncomprehending, automatic
dismissal of the possibility of equal consideration [of animals’ interests] is deemed worthy of publication in
many medical journals” (p. 49, footnote 21). Casual perusal of the World Wide Web reveals animal
agribusiness, hunters, and trappers expressing praise for Cohen’s arguments as well.
[2] For a contrary view, see R. G. F, (2001) Justifying animal experimentation: the starting point in E.
F. Paul and J. Paul (eds.) Why Animal Experimentation Matters: The Use of Animals in Medical Research
(London, Transaction Publishers), pp. 197–214. This list of experimental procedures is from T. Regan
(2002) Empty cages: animal rights and vivisection, in Ryder, R., Matfield, M., Derbyshire, D. and Regan,
T. Animal Experimentation: Good or Bad? (London, Hodder & Stoughton Educational). Michael Allan Fox
provides a similar catalogue of procedures, noting that anaesthesia is often not used, in M. A. Fox (1986)
The Case for Animal Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspectives (Berkeley, University of
California Press), p. 97.
[3] For clarity, animal advocates have no quarrel with research that does not harm animals at all (e.g.
observational studies in the wild), research with non-conscious, non-sentient animals, and therapeutic
research where the individual animal subjects also benefit (or will probably benefit) from the research. It,

of course, is inadequate to claim that since ‘the species’ benefits, some vivisection is justified: ‘the
species’ of humans, i.e. some humans, might benefit from human vivisection, but that presumably
wouldn’t justify it. For discussion, see D. DeGrazia (1999) The ethics of animal research: what are the
prospects for agreement? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 8, pp. 23–34.
[4] C. Cohen (1986). The case for the use of animals in biomedical research, The New England Journal of
Medicine, 315, 14, October 2, pp. 865–870, p. 865.
[5] Since being alive is a necessary condition for the satisfaction of interests, animals who have interests
have, at least derivatively, an interest in their lives continuing.
[6] Cohen (2001), p. 22, in C. Cohen and T. Regam (2001) The Animal Rights Debate (Lanham, MD,
Rowman and Littlefield).
[7] T. Regan, pp. 19–20, footnote 1, in Cohen, C. and Regan, T. (2001) op. cit. Emphasis mine.
[8] For example, one theoretical concern is what rights views (for animals and humans) imply for cases of
conflict, e.g. ‘lifeboat’ cases. These puzzles are philosophically challenging, but, they no more need to be
solved to answer many current practical questions concerning animals than they need to be solved to
address analogous questions concerning humans: e.g. despite controversies and unsatisfactorily
answered questions about rights (and ethical theory in general), few are skeptical about (or practically
paralyzed by the question of ) whether humans (‘marginal’ or not) should be vivisected or not. For
discussion of lifeboat problems, see A. Taylor (2003) Ethics and Animals (Calgary, Broadview Press), pp.
134–135.
[9] Cohen, C. (1986) op. cit., p. 866; C. Cohen (1997) Do animals have rights? Ethics & Behavior, 7, 2,
91–102, pp. 94–98; Cohen, C. (2001) op. cit., pp. 30–40. Cohen’s arguments are quite similar in all his
writings: more recent discussions are not more developed.
[10] Although Cohen’s discussion strongly suggests that possession of rights depends on moral agency, it
is not completely clear that he thinks this, since he says that he will not even attempt to explain the
foundations of rights: see Cohen, C. (2001) op. cit. DeGrazia reports that Cohen ‘never really argues that
humans have rights, instead [he relies on] appealing to the authority of philosophical tradition’ to support
his claim that humans have rights. D. DeGrazia (2003) Review of Cohen, Carl and Regan, Tom. The
Animal Rights Debate, Ethics 113, 3, pp. 692–695, p. 692. Regan argues that Cohen “fails to offer any
explanation [of ] what makes claims to rights valid . . . Why we should accept his assertion that rights are
valid claims, and what he means when he says that they are, thus are and, in his hands, must remain
matters of pure conjecture, lacking anything by way of requisite explanation let alone thoughtful
justification,” Regan in Cohen and regan (2001) op. cit., p. 273.
[11] Cohen (1986) op. cit., p. 866, emphasis mine.
[12] Cohen (1986) op. cit., p. 866. This response is also in Cohen (2001) op. cit., pp. 36–37 in Cohen and
Regan (2001) op. cit.
[13] Cohen (1986) op. cit., p. 866. This response is also in Cohen, C. (2001), pp. 36–37, in Cohen and
Regan (2001) op. cit.
[14] Cohen, C. (1986) op. cit., p. 866. Emphasis mine.
[15] Scruton continues, “It is this that causes us to extend to them the shield that we consciously extend
to each other and which is built collectively through our moral dialogue.” Note the conflation between what

might cause us to believe that such ‘marginal’ humans have such rights and the moral justification for
such rights. R. Scruton (2000) Animal Rights and Wrongs (London, Demos), p. 55.
[16] James Rachels interprets Cohen’s claim that ‘the issue is one of kind’ as the claim that what’s morally
relevant is what’s statistically normal for most individuals of a species. He then argues that this approach
is mistaken since it falsely implies that a statistically abnormal intelligent, thoughtful chimp who could
engage us in conversation couldn’t have rights. J. Rachels (1990) Created from Animals: The Moral
Implications of Darwinism (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 186–187.
[17] A. White (1984) Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press). The quotation is reprinted in T. Regan and
P. Singer (1989) Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall), pp. 119121, p. 120. Emphasis mine.
[18] Cohen (2001) op. cit., p. 37.
[19] Although he does not quite say so, presumably the kind that Cohen has in mind is the biological kind
homo sapiens, since he does advocate ‘speciesism.’ See C. Cohen (2001) The moral inequality of
species: why ‘speciesism’ is right, pp. 59–68 in Cohen, C. and Regan, T. (2001) op. cit. I should note that
Cohen misunderstands what is typically meant by ‘speciesism.’ He mistakenly thinks that if one rejects
speciesism then one will treat all animals exactly the same, irrespective of their different needs and
dispositions. But those who reject speciesism reject the view that for comparable harms to a human and a
non-human, the harms to a human are, considered in themselves, necessarily morally worse. But of
course they think animals should be treated according to their different interests.
[20] James Rachels objects to Cohen’s denying ‘moral individualism,’ the thesis that how an individual
should be treated depends on his or her own characteristics, not others’ characteristics or what groups
that individual is a member. This objection isn’t quite successful since one’s own characteristics include
one’s relations to others and group or kind memberships. Rachels surely thinks that the fact that
‘marginal’ humans and animals are members of the ‘group’ or ‘kind’ sentient being is morally relevant
(although we would typically just say that it’s because they are sentient, rather than the wordier, but
equivalent, claim that they are of that group or kind). So there is nothing necessarily problematic in
appealing to kinds or groups: the problem is appealing to morally irrelevant ones and failing to defend
one’s views. See Rachels, J. (1990) op. cit., pp. 173–174, 187.
[21] Fox (1986) op. cit., pp. 56, 60, emphases mine; M. A. Fox (1987) Animal experimentation: a
philosopher’s changing views’ Between the Species 3, 55–60, 75, 80, 82.
[22] D. Schmidtz (1998) Are all species equal? Journal of Applied Philosophy 15, 1, pp. 57–76, p. 61.
Emphasis mine.

